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This paper examines the changes in the internationalisation of innovation created by the recent 
surge of Chinese innovative firms and the resultant effects on global economic organisation. 
Drawing insights from the international business, economic geography and development studies 
literatures, it investigates the rise and internationalisation of Chinese innovative firms from the 
perspective of strategic coupling, decoupling and recoupling. This novel approach provides a 
first glimpse into the potential impact of the Chinese innovative firms on global business 
leadership, power relationships in global value chains and ultimately into global economic 
organisation.  
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A growing number of studies now regard China as having the potential to become a leading 
global power in R&D and innovation terms (e.g., Shi et al., 2014; Sigurdson, 2005; Peerenboom, 
2007), thus creating a growing challenge to Triad innovation hegemony driven by U.S., Europe 
and Japan. This trend is now beginning to be realised as evidenced by the increasing number of 
Chinese firms that are now becoming global innovation players in their own right, enabling them 
to challenge developed country multinational enterprises (DMNEs) for the leadership of global 
value chains (GVCs) and global markets (Henderson and Nadvi, 2011).  
However, despite these indications that China is rapidly drawing closer to the heart of 
WKHZRUOG¶VWHFKQRORJ\DQG5	'QHWZRUNV9on Zedtwitz, 2004; Walsh, 2007), there seems to 
be insufficient understanding of the nature of the new Chinese démarche in innovation and its 
consequent impact on global economic organisation. This apparent gap in the literature stirs us to 
investigate the nature and extent of the rise of innovative China-origin MNEs and their changing 
roles in global economic organization.   
Despite the focus on Chinese firms, we would argue that the discussion is relevant to the 
wider debate on emerging economic multinational enterprises (EMNEs). Indeed, there is an 
agreement amongst scholars that the spread of global production networks (GPNs) (Henderson et 
al, 2002) has created new opportunities for EMNEs, facilitating the transfer of R&D and 
technological knowledge away from traditional Triad locations to leading new centres, 
particularly in the Asia Pacific Region (Bruche, 2009; WIPO; 2012). A number of scholars 
believe that this trend has been reinforced by a process of µVWUDWHJLFFRXSOLQJ¶EHWZHHQ(01(V
and global lead firms, usually supported by national and regional governments (MacKinnon, 
2012; Yeung, 2009), helping EMNEs to become significant participants in GVCs. However, 
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other scholars (such as Altenburg et al., 2008; Awate et al., 2012) seem to have doubt about the 
nature and significance of these trends and the innovation capabilities that rising EMNEs are 
developing. It is therefore not yet clear what kinds of µSRZHU¶ WKHVH (01(V will exert in the 
future global economy (Sinkovics et al., 2014; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2015), notwithstanding 
evidence to the effect that some EMNEs have already emerged as co-leaders of GVCs or 
strategic partners of lead firms (Azmeh and Nadvi, 2014; Gereffi, 2014; Choksy, 2015).  
With these debates in mind, this paper studies the rise of innovative Chinese firms and 
seeks to gauge the resultant impact on global economic organisation, drawing on cognate 
academic literatures from international business, economic geography and economic 
development as a means to this end. Our analysis of Chinese innovative firms indicates that their 
rise and internationalisation is associated with a VHULHV RI µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ GHFRXSOLQJ DQG
UHFRXSOLQJ¶ (Coe et al., 2004; Horner, 2013) processes which have resulted in their accumulating 
significant innovation capabilities, enabling them to play an increasingly prominent role in 
GVCs. In addition, the rise and internationalisation of these Chinese innovative firms will create 
new strategic coupling, decoupling and recoupling opportunities for firms and regions at home 
and abroad.  
The contributions that this paper makes are twofold. First, in a response to recent calls 
(Mudambi, 2015) for a dialogue between international business, economic geography and 
innovation, it explains the catch-up and internationalisation process of Chinese innovative firms 
IURPDXQLTXHOHQVRIµVWUDWHJLFFRXSOLQJ¶Second, it contributes to the literature of international 
business, economic geography and developments studies by analysing the resultant changing 
position of Chinese firms in GVCs/GPNs and therefore in future global economic organisation. 
7KH µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ-decoupling-UHFRXSOLQJ¶ IUDPHZRUN DOORZV XV WR µ]RRP LQ¶ LQ RUGHU WR
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focus on the catch-XSDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQSURFHVVEXWDOVRWRµ]RRPRXW¶ in order to gauge 
the resultant change in global economic organization.       
The article is organised as follows: first we provide a conceptual background to the 
inter-related phenomena of the internationalisation of innovation and the catch-up process of 
EMNEs, explaining the strategic coupling perspective. Thereafter, our methodological strategy 
and research context are presented. We then selected two potential Chinese innovative firms to 
analyse in detail their rise and internationalisation and the role of strategic coupling in these 
processes. We then discuss the resultant challenges to GVCs/GPNs and global economic 
organisation. Finally, the paper concludes with some suggested directions for future related 
research. 
 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF INNOVATION, THE RISE OF EMNEs 
AND STRATEGIC COUPLING 
Internationalisation of innovation and the role of emerging markets 
There is a strong consensus amongst scholars that economic globalisation involves not only the 
internationalisation of production networks but also the internationalisation of R&D and 
technological innovation (Dunning and Lundan, 2009; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; Huggins et al., 
2007). MNEs make a major contribution to the internationalisation of innovation, by means of 
the internationalisation of corporate R&D, as well as by international cross-patenting, 
technological and scientific collaborations, and their exporting, international licensing and FDI 
activities (Narula and Zanfei, 2003; Lew and Liu, 2016). The internationalisation of innovation 
and the role played by MNEs in this process are, however, changing substantially over time 
(Howells, 1990; Matthews, 2006). A wave pattern has been followed, involving changes in the 
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location and characteristics of innovation activities, and the successive emergence of 
innovation-intensive MNEs based in the Triad regions and then emerging economies such as the 
BRIC countries.  
Triad-based MNEs began the first wave (which continued from 1945 to the 1990s) by 
performing overseas R&D in a significant way (Reddy, 1997), and aggressively engaging in 
OFDI in order to keep the control of key technologies inside the firm (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
1999). Many of their direct investment activities took place predominantly within the Triad 
regions. The majority were initially linked to the adaptation of existing technologies, products 
and processes developed in home countries (Pearce, 1990), and to gaining entry and increasing 
their shares of foreign markets (Reddy, 1997). While this home-base-exploiting (HBE) R&D 
related investment still continued, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the increasing development of 
home-base-augmenting (HBA) investment in Triad locations (Kuemmerle, 1999). Many MNEs 
therefore undertook knowledge-seeking R&D abroad with the aim of generating new knowledge 
and competencies of value to their global strategies and operations (Cantwell and Mudambi, 
2005; Pearce, 1999).  
While the first wave in the internationalisation of innovation was almost exclusively 
confined to Triad countries, the second wave (continuing from the late 1990s up to the present 
day) has seen the increasing location of Triad-controlled R&D in emerging economies 
(UNCTAD, 2005b). Several key factors have driven this trend, including the favourable inward 
investment policies pursued by many such countries (Lundin and Schwaag Serger, 2007); the 
growing need for technology transfer from the Triad to emerging market countries, which locally 
based R&D can facilitate (Walsh, 2007); the availability of large numbers of highly qualified and 
skilled, yet low cost scientific and engineering personnel that these countries offer (Von Zedwitz, 
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2004; Reddy, 1997; UNCTAD, 2005b); and their development of fast growing domestic markets 
for technologically advanced products contributed by local R&D centres (Bruche, 2009). 
The growth of R&D related investment from Triad-based DMNEs into emerging market 
countries has gathered pace phenomenally over recent years, resulting in China and India, for 
H[DPSOH QRZ EHFRPLQJ WKH ZRUOG¶V OHDGLQJ GHVWLQDWLRQV IRU VXFK DFWLYLWLHV 2(&' 
UNCTAD, 2005a) and increasingly important locations for foreign corporate R&D (Bruche, 
2009; Lundin and Schwaag Serger, 2007). Early R&D investment in these new host countries 
IRFXVHG LQLWLDOO\ RQ µDGDSWLYH 5	'¶, involving the one-way transfer of technology from the 
Triad, facilitating the customisation RI'01(V¶HVWDEOLVKHGSURGXFWVWRPHHWORFDOPDUNHWQHHGV
(Krishna et al.  µ*OREDO 5	' FHQWrHV¶ KDYH KRZHYHU EHHQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ HVWDEOLVKHG LQ
China and India, with their mandates going beyond mere product adaptation to include 
developing new products for the global market (Lundin and Schwaag Serger, 2007; Walsh, 2007; 
Krishna et al., 2012).  
GVCs continue to be dominated by DMNEs, which have played the leading role in 
organising and controlling production and the diffusion of knowledge in most sectors, based on 
their superior, knowhow-related capabilities (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Ernst, 2009; Khan and 
Nicholson, 2015). However, the growing geographical dispersion of R&D has also created 
opportunities for latecomer firms from China and India to upgrade their knowhow-related 
capabilities and to gain access to new technologies via the insertion in Triad-led GVCs 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Altenburg et al., 2008). This has helped them to develop as 
innovators and MNEs in their own right (Yin and Williamson, 2011).  
 
Strategic coupling and the rise of EMNEs 
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Associated with the increasing scholarly attention to EMNEs, there is also a growing 
concern that the traditional International Business (IB) framework, developed in the context of 
'01(V¶DFWLYLWLHVPD\QRWEHVXIILFLHQWWRH[SODLQWKHULVHDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI(01(V 
(Buckley and Ghauri, 2004; Mudambi, 2008). In particular, there is a growing recognition that 
VFKRODUVQHHG WREHWWHUXQGHUVWDQG WKH LQIOXHQFHRI µORFDWLRQ-VSHFLILFDVVHWV¶ 1DUXOD2) on 
the development of EMNEs and this where IB can learn from cognate disciplines such as 
economic geography.   
In the economic geography literature, the rapid rise of firms in emerging economies and 
East Asia in particular is understood in the wider context of regional development that is enabled 
by the insertion of local firms in GVCs/GPNs usually facilitated by developmental state 
institutions (Yueng, 2009). In particular, the continuing specialisation and µILQH-VOLFLQJ¶
(Buckley, 2009) of value chain activities by global lead firms and the subsequent 
re-configuration of these activities in geographically dispersed locations have provided a window 
of opportunity for firms and regions in developing countries to plug themselves into 
GVCs/GPNs (Yueng, 2009; Schmitz and Strambach, 2009).  
The concept of strategic coupling (Coe et al., 2004) was initially developed to bring 
together regional or territorial dynamics and the GVCs/GPNs dynamics in accounting for 
regional development (Yueng, 2014). 7KH UHDOLJQPHQW RI UHJLRQDO DFWRUV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQFOXGLQJ
those of local firms on one hand and global lead firms on the other can be beneficial to both 
parties by creating upgrading opportunities for the former but also helping global lead firms to 
maintain their competitiveness (ibid). 
Focusing on the experience of East Asian countries, Yueng (2009), for example, 
identified three types of strategic coupling between lead firms in GPNs and local firms. Firstly, 
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there are international partnerships in Taiwan and Singapore where the region is directly 
articulated into critical GPNs with local firms serving as strategic partners of lead firms or lead 
firms having a direct presence through FDI. Secondly, there is the case of indigenous innovation 
led by national champions (such as Samsung and LG in South Korea) who have become lead 
firms in GPNs as a result of decades of national industrial policy, while undertaking strategic 
coupling with global lead firms via technology licensing and agreements. Thirdly, there are 
production platforms coordinated by global lead firms and their local strategic partners as seen in 
some high-growth regions in China, Thailand and Malaysia.  
Other scholars have also tried to deepen the conceptualisation of strategic coupling by 
LQWURGXFLQJµGHFRXSOLQJ¶DQGµUHFRXSOLQJ¶ to reflect the dynamic two-way selection process by 
global lead firms and regions for investment and reinvestment (MacKinnon, 2012). Applying 
this framework, Horner (2013) illustrated WKH HYROXWLRQ RI ,QGLD¶V SKDUPDFHXWLFDO LQGXVWU\
through a dynamic strategic coupling, decoupling and recoupling process over the last few 
GHFDGHV,QSDUWLFXODUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVWULFWLRQRIJOREDOOHDGILUPV¶GRPLQDQFHRIWKHIndian 
market in the 1970s and 1980s represented a selective and short-term strategic decoupling 
process that helped to rebalance power relations between local firms and global lead firms and 
created opportunities for imitative learning and functional upgrading for the former. Subsequent 
recoupling has seen large Indian firms partnering with foreign MNEs and some of them have 
even established their own global production networks.  
7KH XVHIXOQHVV RI WKH µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ-decoupling-UHFRXSOLQJ¶ IUDPHZRUN DUe 
WZRIROG ILUVWO\ LW VXSSOHPHQWV WKH ,%¶s focus on firm-level strategies with the territorial 
dynamics. This means that firms can develop and enhance their competitive advantages by 
tapping into local knowledge base and coordinating knowledge across geographic space in their 
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internationalisation effort. Secondly, it builds a connection to the GVC/GPN dynamics which 
enables the possibility to examine the changing role of Chinese innovative firms in GVCs/GPNs 
and therefore the resultant change in global economic organisation. The application of the 
µstrategic coupling-decoupling-UHFRXSOLQJ¶ framework therefore renders an examination of the 
rise of the internationalisation of EMNEs from a unique angle. The analysis of the resultant 
change in the evolution of GVCs/GPNs also enables a contribution to an area that receives little 
scholarly attention so far.  
In the following sections, we endeavour to analyse the catch-up and internationalisation 
of Chinese innovative firms HPSOR\LQJ WKH µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ ± decoupling ± UHFRXSOLQJ¶
framework. We view these Chinese innovative firms¶UHFHQW5	'LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQDVtaking 
advantage of a recoupling mechanism. In addition, our focus is not only regarding the influence 
of GVCs/GPNs on the rise of the Chinese innovative firms, but also the impact of their rise and 
internationalisation on GVCs/GPNs.        
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND STRATEGY  
We began by identifying those Chinese firms which are now joining the world¶V µleague table¶ of 
biggest R&D spenders, drawing our data from the EU's industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard, 
which contains information about the world's most active top R&D companies. Scrutiny of the 
EU's industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard reveals that a number of Chinese firms have recently 
been joining this elite list of global innovators; some have been ascending it at a remarkable rate 
over the last decade, indicating that they are investing increasingly heavily in R&D and 
innovation.. If we focus on the top 685 biggest R&D investing companies, only two Chinese oil 
companies, PetroChina and China Petroleum & Chemical, achieved inclusion in the Scoreboard 
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in 2003; however the number of Chinese listed firms has since jumped rapidly, reaching 16 in total 
in 2009 and 30 in 2013. 
The majority of these 30 Chinese firms have quickly improved their positions in terms both of 
their overall rankings (based on the amount of R&D investment) in the Scoreboard (or their 
µJOREDO UDQNLQJ¶ DQG LQ WKHLU UDQNLQJV DJDLQVW SHHUV ZLWKLQ WKHLU RZQ VHFWRUV their µVHFWRUDO
UDQNLQJ¶ Further analysis was conducted WRH[DPLQH&KLQHVHILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQWHUPVRI
global and sectoral ranking, R&D investment, its growth and intensity) against the relevant 
sectoral average ± the average performance of Scoreboard firms in a given sector. This procedure 
helped to identify 19 leading Chinese R&D-active firms which clearly outperformed the sectoral 
average (see Table 1) and can therefore, on this basis EHFODVVLILHGDVULVLQJµLQQRYDWLRQstars¶(with 
a growing ability to challenge for the future global competitive leadership of their sectors). These 
firms include: China Merchants Bank (in the Banks sector), China Railway, China Railway 
Construction, China State Construction Engineering, China Communication Construction, China 
National Chemical Engineering, and Power Construction Corporation of China (in the 
Construction & Materials sector), BYD (in Electric & Electrical Equipment), CSR China, China 
CNR, Shanghai Electric, Dongfang Electric and Sany Heavy Industry (in Industrial Engineering), 
HBIS (in the Industrial Metals & Mining sector), PetroChina and China Petroleum & Chemicals 
(in the Oil and Gas Producers sector), Huawei and ZTE (in the Technology Hardware & 
Equipment sector), and Ctrip (in the Travel & Leisure sector).  
Insert Table 1 here 
In order to further explore WKHLU ULVH DQG µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ ± decoupling ±UHFRXSOLQJ¶
process, we then selected two of the leading firms from this pool, Huawei and CSR China, for 
further analysis. These two firms were selected because they are widely viewed and reported as 
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representatives of Chinese innovative firms both inside and outside of China (Fan, 2011; 
McKinsey, 2015). Both firms have significant overseas investment and engage in R&D activities 
overseas. They were therefore well suited to illustrate the rise of Chinese innovative firms and 
the impact of their internationalisation.  
The data that we used were collected from publicly available secondary sources including 
previous academic research, books, company documentation as well as media reports in both 
English and Chinese. We followed standard procedures for qualitative data analysis (Eisenhardt 
and GraeEQHU0LOHVDQG+XEHUPDQZLWKWKHDLPWRHQKDQFHWKHµWUXVWZRUWKLQHVV¶
of the research (Sinkovics et al., 2008).  
 
HUAWEI AND CSR CHINA: STRATEGIC COUPLING, DECOUPLING AND 
RECOUPLING 
Huawei 
Huawei was founded in 1988 with 21,000 Yuan (then equivalent to $US 4,400). The company has 
quickly emerged to become a leading global telecom solutions provider with annual sales of US 
$60.8 billion in 20152YHUUHFHQW\HDUVWKHFRPSDQ\KDVEHFRPHRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VWRSSDWHQW
applicants under the global Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (WIPO, 2012). Its innovations 
include WKHµDistributed Base Station¶ which was considered a major breakthrough in 3G network 
construction as it provided telecommunication operators multiple benefits of space saving, site 
flexibility, high-bandwidth and low installation and operational costs. Huawei also pioneered the 
development of reconfigurable base-stations with the ability to support different mobile-network 
technologies or multiple technologies simultaneously (The Economist, 2010). The company is 
now at the forefront of long-term evolution (LTE) development (the standard for fourth-generation 
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(4G) wireless networks), based on its leadership of related technologies, and its understanding of 
FXVWRPHUV¶QHHGVHQDEOLQJLWWRZLQQHDUO\KDOIRIZRUOG¶VFRPPHUFLDO/7(GHSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWV
by 2011 (Huawei, 2013). It is also leading 5G development having launched the world's first 
multi-user 5G testing site in Chengdu, China in 2015.  
Early technological development and strategic coupling 
Huawei¶V ILUVW EXVLQHVV ZDV UHVHOOLQJ WHOHSKRQH VZLWFKERDUGs (private branch exchange, PBX) 
imported from Hong Kong. However its senior management team had a clear ambition for R&D 
and in 1990 it developed its own PBX switching gear led by its in-house R&D team, imitating 
existing products already available on the market (Zhang, 2009). Collaborating with Chinese 
universities and recruiting domestic talents, Huawei then made a major breakthrough by 
introducing a digital telephone switch called C&CO8 in 1993. This represented the highest 
capacity at the time for a device of its type manufactured in China and paved the way for its 
dissemination WKURXJKRXW &KLQD¶V QDWLRQDO WHOHSKRQ\ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH (IET, 2007). Realising its 
disadvantages in technology and brand recognition, Huawei HQJDJHG LQD µHQFLUFOLQJ WKHFLWLHV
IURP WKH FRXQWU\VLGH¶ VWUDWHJ\, choosing to focus firstly on the rural market before gradually 
entering urban markets then dominated by foreign multinationals (Zhang, 2009).  
Having strengthened its in-house innovation capability, Huawei also started to 
collaborate with global leaders (such as Texas Instruments, Motorola, IBM, Intel and Sun) 
operating in China in order to access more advanced telecom technology (Fan, 2006; Fan, 2011). 
This collaboration (which usually took the form of either joint ventures or joint laboratories (Fan, 
2006; Zhang, 2009) further enhanced Huawei¶VWHFKQRORJLFDOFDSDELOLW\and also helped to shape 
its commitment to international collaboration and open innovation.   
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In the meantime, Huawei initiated its internationalisation campaign (following an 
overseas version of its µHQFLUFOLQJWKHFLWLHVIURPWKHFRXQWU\VLGH¶VWUDWHJ\ (Zhu, 2008)). It firstly 
entered neighbouring Hong Kong, followed in turn by Russia, South America and South East Asia 
and then developed markets. The major breakthrough was made in 2005 when Huawei was 
selected by BT as one of the eight preferred suppliers of its 21st Century Network. This announced 
the arrival of Huawei into the developed markets. A year later the company obtained a framework 
contract for mobile softswitching from Vodafone for its various European, Middle Eastern and 
African (IET, 2007), followed by many other similar contract thereafter across the world.  
 
Decoupling 
North America represents the world¶V largest telecom market and therefore Huawei attached 
considerable importance to entering and developing it. However, this turned out to be a difficult 
challenge for Huawei. The first blow arrived in 2003 when Cisco Systems accused Huawei of 
patent infringement. Although Cisco later withdrew the lawsuit and both companies resolved all 
patent litigation, Huawei had to compromise by withdrawing all of its products from the U.S. 
market (Zhu, 2008). Huawei tried again by establishing a joint venture with 3COM, but its later 
acquisition proposal for this company (in 2007) was rejected by the U.S. Committee on Foreign 
Investment (CFIUS) on the grounds of alleged national security concerns. Despite that Huawei 
promised to open source code to public scrutiny, the same national security concerns blocked its 
later bid for the Sprint supply contract in 2010 and its proposed $200 million acquisition of 3Leaf 
in 2011. In 2012 the U.S. House intelligence-committee report alleged that equipment produced by 
Huawei and its home rival ZTE, when employed by U.S. companies, could become a vehicle for 
Chinese spying in the U.S. which could therefore pose risks to national security. These cases all 
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indicated that Huawei was not welcomed by the U.S. authorities, with the result that it was forced, 
albeit reluctantly, to focus instead on other markets.  
 
Recoupling 
Huawei¶VUHFRXSOLQJKDSSHQHGLQvarious ways. Firstly, there was a refocus away from U.S. to 
Europe, China and other markets. In 2013, for example, Huawei pledged to invest £1.3 billion in 
the UK over five years (RQHRI&KLQD¶VODUJHVWLQYHVWments in Europe), symbolising the growing 
strategic importance of Europe - and its status as a source of technological innovation ± to the 
company following its disengagement from the U.S.. Secondly, Huawei has established a 
significant global innovation network by setting up dedicated R&D centres overseas in addition to 
the domestic ones. For example, Huawei established its first overseas centre in Bangalore, India in 
1999 and it now has a total of 22 overseas R&D centres (located in Europe, North America, Asia 
Pacific and South Africa). The company also operates 36 joint innovation centres across the world.  
Thirdly, there has been significant build-up of its capability in the smart mobile phone 
market. Huawei¶V WUDGLWLRQDOFRUHEXVLQHVV LV WR supply equipment to telecom operators, the so 
FDOOHG µFDUULHU EXVLQHVV¶ Efforts have also been made tR VWUHQJWKHQ LWV µHQWHUSULVH EXVLQHVV¶ ± 
business that provides solutions for business customers. However, the most impressive change in 
its business relates to the smart phone market. In about DGHFDGH¶Vtime, Huawei has emerged from 
a small volume, lower-end producer to become in 2015 WKH ZRUOG¶V WKLUG ODUJHVW VPDUW SKRQH
producer, closing the gap with leading companies, Apple and Samsung. Unlike most other smart 
phone producers from emerging economies, Huawei has also been able to gain a strong foothold in 
the lucrative higher-end market for smart phones, relying on its in-house developed chips to 




CSR China is a state-owned enterprise that has become renowned for its design, engineering and 
production of electric multiple units (EMUs) IRU &KLQD¶V KLJK-speed railway network. The 
company was formed in 2000 as a spin-off of China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry 
Corporation (Group) and renamed CSR China in 2007. It LV D PDMRU IRUFH EHKLQG &KLQD¶V
impressive expansion of high-speed railway network, producing EMUs that ran at a speed of 350 
km/ hour. In December 2010, its CRH380A EMU set a world record of 486.1 km/hour in trial 
operation (Chuang and Johnson, 2011), powered by an EMU convertor with the highest powered 
single unit in the world. 
 
Early technological development and strategic coupling 
The history of CSR China FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&KLQD¶VILUVWORFRPRWLYHDQG
rolling stock manufacturer in 1897 and this has since then remained its core business despite a 
number of restructuring efforts. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China upgraded its existing railway 
lines several times, boosting the national average passenger train speed from under 50km/h to 
nearly 70km/h, with a highest speed of 200km/h being achieved on limited rail lines. The Chinese 
government believed, however, that the country had reached a limit in upgrading its existing 
railways and that the construction of a high-speed railway was thus urgently needed. Working with 
a number of other firms and research institutions with coordination by the then-Ministry of 
Railway (MOR), CSR China PDQDJHGWRGHVLJQDQGPDQXIDFWXUH&KLQD¶VRZQKLJK-speed train - 
WKH µ&KLQD 6WDU¶ ± that set a record of 321km/h (New Financial Observer, 2011). But this 
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indigenous innovation was quickly called to an end as the MOR turned its eyes to foreign 
technology.  
Following aQ µLPSRUW DVVLPLODWH DQG UH-LQQRYDWLRQ¶ VWUDWHJ\ UHJDUGLQJ WHFKQRORJLFDO
development, the MOR solicited bids from China-foreign business partnerships to make 
high-speed train sets that could travel at 200-250 km/h with specific requirement for technological 
WUDQVIHU WR &KLQHVH FRPSDQLHV -DSDQ¶V .DZDVDNL +HDY\ ,QGXVWULHV DQG &DQDGD¶V Bombardier 
both won contracts through their respective partnerships with CSR China¶VVXEVLGLDUy Qingdao 
Sifang. Siemens and Alstom also won similar deals collaborating with CSR China¶VKRPHULYDO, 
CNR China.  
The new access to foreign technologies significantly enhanced CSR China¶V
technological development in high-speed trains. Foreign firms helped set up production facilities 
in China, trained Chinese engineers and assisted CSR China in developing its own supply chain for 
train components. CSR China also made enormous efforts to assimilate foreign technologies, 
deciding that on top of every dollar spent on these technologies, they would invest an additional 
three dollars to help assimilate and apply them (McKinsey, 2015).  
 
Decoupling 
In a sense decoupling for CSR China already started when foreign giants won their 
contracts. )RUHLJQILUPV¶VXSSO\FRQWUDFWs with the MOR meant that, initially a limited number of 
high-speed train sets were directly exported to China, while later on a small number were kits 
assembled in the country. Subsequent train sets were made in China using transferred technology 
with domestic and imported parts.  
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Having the GHWHUPLQDWLRQWRGHVLJQHQJLQHHUDQGPDQXIDFWXUH&KLQD¶VRZQKLJK-speed 
train sets for future generations, the MOR, together with the FRXQWU\¶VMinistry of Science and 
Technology, coordinated an army of firms, research institutions and engineers from across the 
country to facilitate the assimilation of foreign technologies and further technology development. 
Dedicated efforts were made to improve the entire Chinese high-speed railway system including 
the aerodynamics of high-speed train sets, signalling and control sub-systems, safety mechanisms, 
propulsion sub-systems and environmental impacts.  
What happened subsequently is very impressive: within a few years, CSR China was able 
itself to design, engineer and produce EMUs that ran at a speed of 350 km/ hour. In December 
2010, its CRH380A EMU set a world record of 486.1 km/hour in trial operation. Whilst the 
achievement can clearly be ascribed to the adaptation and development of imported technologies, 
it also depended for its success on the coPSDQ\¶V H[LVWLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV DQG VWURQJ DEVRUSWLYH
capabilities. The company has also further developed and strengthened its core technological 
capabilities in engineering and producing high-speed EMUs, particularly in the areas of propulsion 
and control. For example, in 2010 it developed an EMU convertor with the highest single unit 
power in the world, helping it to propel the CRH380A. Such was the speed of CSR China¶V 
innovation and that of CNR China that when the 1300km Beijing-Shanghai high-speed rail line 
became operational in 2011, all of the necessary high-speed train sets were supplied by these two 
firms. China then went on to construct a high speed rail network with over 19,000 km of track in 




Having confidence in its own technologies, CSR China felt the need to conquer foreign markets as 
a way of recoupling with GPNs after becoming the biggest supplier of train sets for ChinD¶V 
high-speed railways. The company already exported electric locomotives to the Middle East and 
Central Asia in 1997 and 2001 -2002 respectively. Being able to use fast domestic developments in 
VXSSO\LQJ&KLQD¶VGRPHVWLFhigh-speed railway and urban transit markets as a reference point, 
CSR China won contracts to supply modern underground trains to India in 2010. In 2013, it went 
on to sign a near- $US1bn contract to supply EMUs to Argentina, followed by a subsequent 
contract for technological support and training. From 2011 to 2014, the value of CSR China¶V
overseas contracts increased over 300% from $US0.89 bn to $US3.7 bn (Science and Technology 
Daily, 2015).  
In order to further strengthen its technological development and support its international 
expansion, CSR China has also made significant efforts to develop its R&D internationalisation. 
These included its acquisition of the semiconductor producer Dynex in Lincoln, UK (in 2008) 
providing it with access to technological know-how in terms of insulated-gate bipolar transistors 
(IGBT) - a core component that UHSUHVHQWV WKH µKHDUW¶RI WKHSURSXOVLRQDQGFRQWURO V\VWHPRI
high-speed railways. In 2011, CSR China went on to establish a global innovation centre at Dynex. 
The company has also established joint innovation centres in America and Germany in recent 
years. Other recent overseas expansion included its takeover of Emprendimientos Ferroviarios in 
Argentina and Boge in Germany in 2014 as well as E+M in Germany and SMD in the UK in 2015. 
 
Lessons from the illustrative Cases 
Both of the illustrative cases above indicate that the rise and internationalisation of Chinese 
innovative firms is facilitated by the increasing fragmentation and geographical dispersion of 
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global innovation networks, which is creating considerable opportunities for latecomers in China 
and other emerging market countries to upgrade their know-how related capabilities and gain 
access to new technologies (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). This is being matched and 
complemented by the significant in-house investments that many are currently making in 
innovation (Fu and Gong, 2011).  
Many of these rising giants are engaging increasingly in overseas R&D activities as a way 
of recoupling with GPNs. Apart from Huawei and CSR China, many other such firms have also 
established overseas R&D centres in recent years. According to a recent multi-agency research 
study (Veldhoen et al., 2012) more than 70 of the 100 surveyed Chinese companies plan to expand 
their overseas R&D facilities by the early 2020s. If this occurs, then the R&D internationalisation 
of leading Chinese innovative firms will be intensified in the near future, thus promoting the 
continued rise of the Chinese innovative firms and their strategic recoupling. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Reconfiguration of global business leadership 
Looking at the issue of global industry leadership, it can be seen from our illustrative examples 
that the Chinese LQQRYDWLYHILUPV¶challenge is already well advanced in some sectors, including 
wireless equipment, which has been dominated until recently by DMNEs (Boston Consulting 
Group, 2011). This position is now changing, however since, for example Huawei has risen from 
5th to 2nd place in this sector in overall revenue terms, whilst its Chinese rival =7(¶V revenues 
have also climbed from 8th to 4th place (ibid). The resultant competitive pressure on their DMNE 
rivals continues to grow, which can be seen as being largely responsible for a global 
consolidation across the telecoms equipment industry involving mergers between Alcatel and 
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Lucent in 2006, and between the network-equipment arms of Nokia and Siemens in the same 
year, together with the collapse of Nortel in 2009 (The Economist, 2009).  
CSR China and CNR China merged in 2015 before when they had already become the 
two biggest railway equipment suppliers in the world. The rise of new Chinese innovative firms 
has also made a big impact on the configuration of the global construction equipment industry. 
According to the annual Yellow Table survey by KHL Group (ZKLFKUDQNVWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVW
construction equipment manufacturers), Chinese firms have seen their share of the global top 
50's revenues continuously climbing over the last few years. Over just one decade, Chinese firms 
saw a dramatic increase in their share of these revenues from a mere 1.6% in 2002 to 16.9% in 
2011 (KHLGroup, 2012) whilst Sany and Zoomline have grown from nowhere to become the 
ZRUOG¶Vth and 6th biggest in their sector by sales revenue in 2012.  
Similar changes are arguably under way in other sectors, where, for examSOH &KLQD¶V 
Haier LVQRZWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWKRXVHKROGDSSOLDQFHVPDQXIDFWXUHUZKLOVW Lenovo is its largest 
PC maker. One of the most dramatic changes happened in the wind turbine sector, in which no 
Chinese firm had made its way into the top 10 in 2005, but then four did so in the 2010 rankings, 
occupying 2nd, 4th, 7th , and 10th places respectively (Lema et al., 2013). 
Our analysis indicates that the rise of some of Chinese MNEs have reached such a stage 
that many of them have upgraded their positions in GVCs/GPNs. This resonates some recent 
studies (for example, Horner, 2013; Lema et al., 2013; Yueng, 2014) arguing the emergence of 
EMNEs as global lead firms.  
 
Emergence of a new breed of GVCs/GPNs  
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Despite increasing fragmentation and geographical dispersion (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002), 
most GVCs/GPNs are currently still dominated by DMNEs. They play the leading role in 
organising and controlling production and the creation and diffusion of knowledge in most 
sectors, based on their superior, knowhow-related capabilities (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Ernst, 
2009; Schmitz and Strambach, 2009; Khan and Nicholson, 2015). However, the rise of the new 
global innovative firms in China (and in other emerging economies) indicates that this state of 
affairs is now changing. 
7KHHPHUJHQFHRI&KLQD¶Vinnovative firms, their surging overseas R&D investment, and 
the resultant, on-going reconfiguration of global industrial leadership beg the question as to 
whether we are witnessing the creation of reconfigured GVCs/GPNs that may be largely 
dominated and controlled by some of leading Chinese MNEs. These leading Chinese MNEs, 
including Lenovo, Huawei and Haier, are now becoming GVC µIODJVKLS ILUPV¶ LQ WKHLU RZQ
right, allowing them to enhance their ability to challenge the leadership of their DMNE rivals 
(Altenburg et al., 2008; Ernst, 2009).  
Indeed, recent research indicates that Chinese MNEs are likely to acquire coordinating 
power within a number of GVCs (Lema et al., 2013). We suspect, if this is so, that the rise of the 
Chinese MNEs as lead firms may result in new power relationships within GVCs/GPNs. In 
H[LVWLQJ µRUWKRGR[¶ *9&V leading DMNEs set the terms under which other member firms 
operate, by exercising varying degrees of coordinating power over them (Schmitz and 
Strambach, 2009). They tend, however, to retain strategic innovation activities in-house, 
although dispersing non-core activities amongst other companies (ibid). &KLQD¶VHPHUJLQJ lead 
firms, despite their significant build-up of innovation capability (Zeng and Williamson, 2007), 
may still lack the ability to create cutting-edge innovations (Altenburg et al., 2008; Awate et al., 
24 
2012) and may not fully own and control strategic innovation. This suggests that new power 
relationships may well develop within these value chains, involving a hitherto unprecedented 
separation of control of technology from value chain coordination. Thus the new power 
relationships within GVCs/GPNs that Chinese firms could lead are therefore likely to be very 
different from those that currently exist, in which DMNEs enjoy control of technology and 
coordination of GVCs at the same time.  
 
New opportunities for strategic coupling, decoupling and recoupling 
As illustrated by the cases of Huawei and CSR China, there has also been some decoupling and 
recoupling associated with the rise of the Chinese innovative firms. In particular, many of them 
are in the process of building their own global innovation and production networks (similar to 
the Indian pharmaceutical giants described in Horner (2013), including setting up R&D centres 
in developed countries. This recoupling has acted as a significant source of opportunities for 
Chinese firms to learn about advanced technologies and access strategic innovation that are 
unlikely to be available by purely importing foreign technologies.   
Interestingly, the rise and internationalisation of EMNEs from China (and other emerging 
economies) are likely also to JHQHUDWH QHZ µVWUDWHJLF FRXSOLQJ GHFRXSOLQJ DQG UHFRXSOLQJ¶
opportunities for firms and regions in developed countries. Their innovation capabilities 
(Williamson, 2015) and unique understanding of the bottom of the customer pyramid markets 
(Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011), for example, offer potential learning opportunities for 
developed country firms. DMNEs can learn about µQHZEXVLQHVVPRGHOVPDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHV
RUWHFKQRORJLHVIURPORFDOFRPSHWLWRUVVXSSOLHUVDQGFXVWRPHUVLQHPHUJLQJPDUNHWV¶,PPHOWet 
al., 2009; Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011) following a process of µUHYHUVH LQQRYDWLRQ¶
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whereby ideas first take shape in emerging economies before trickling-up to the developed world 
(Immelt et al., 2009). At the same time, DMNEs can also learn from EMNEs with which they 
FRPHLQWRFRQWDFWWKURXJKWKHODWWHU¶VLQYHVWPHQW in developed countries (He and Khan, 2015). A 
study of Chinese acquisition in Germany (Knoerich, 2010), for instance, demonstrated how an 
acquisition helped a German firm to access to the Chinese market, enabling it to learn how to 
compete in previously inaccessible market segments. Another recent study (Pietrobelli et al., 
2011) showed how, by investment in Italy, Chinese firms provide their Italian and European 
partners with entry to geographically wide sales networks, and direct access to the huge and 
rapidly expanding Asian market.  
With the continuing rise of Chinese innovative firms (and those from other emerging 
economies) it is not unreasonable to expect that PDQ\ RI WKHPZLOO EHFRPH µJOREDOSLSHOLQHV¶
(Bathelt et al., 2004) serving firms and regions based in other parts of the world. Firstly and as 
we argued above, their increasingly significant innovation capabilities are based on a superior 
understanding of bottom of the customer pyramid markets (Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011). 
This often requires the rethinking of complete production processes and business models, 
necessitating the exercise of distinctive management and organisational skills (Prahalad and 
Mashelkar, 2010; Yin and Williamson, 2011). This creation of new ideas will therefore represent 
a new source of knowledge for other firms and regions. Secondly, the rise of new end markets in 
the global South (Kaplinsky et al., 2011) provide new coupling and recoupling opportunities 
(Horner, 2013). EMNEs (including those from China) are based in these markets, and are thus in 
a unique position to help firms and regions in other parts of the world to connect to the expansive 
market in the Global South (He and Khan, 2015; Knoerich, 2010; Pietrobelli et al., 2011).  
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Towards a new wave in internationalisation of innovation  
The trends discussed in this paper may herald the beginning of a third wave in the 
internationalisation of innovation necessitating a fresh scholarly debate on the role of EMNEs in 
global economic organisation. A comparison between this new and previous waves is illustrated 
in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The new third wave is, arguably different from the previous two owing to the different 
role that is now being played by emerging economies and EMNEs including those from China. 
Unlike the situation in the past (Bruche, 2009), where innovation- related FDI increasingly went 
from developed to developed, or to leading emerging market economies, we believe that the third 
wave will be characterised by a re-direction of FDI from emerging markets back towards 
advanced economies (Buckley et al., 2007; Di Minin et al., 2012). Although some of the resultant 
R&D investments will reflect a HBE motive (Di Minin et al., 2012), most will perhaps prove to be 
HBA related because of the fact that EMNEs do not control strategic innovation yet (Altenburg et 
al., 2008; Awate et al., 2012). Nevertheless, WKHVH ILUPV¶R&D internationalisation will not only 
represent a recoupling for themselves, but will also create coupling and recoupling opportunities 
for firms and regions at home and abroad.  
We consider that the upgrading of EMNEs¶SRVLWLRQVin GVCs, bearing the responsibility 
for their control and coordination is also an unprecedented development in recent times. This 
begs the intriguing question of who will own what levels of power in tomorrow's GVCs. In terms 
of the control of GVCs, Table 2 shows that, the third wave in the internationalisation of innovation 
is likely to see a departure from the established status quo (in which DMNEs that coordinate 
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GVCs also own and control relevant strategic innovations and core technologies). A distributed 
control structure may, in fact emerge as some of the new EMNEs begin to coordinate GVCs, 
whilst strategic innovation remains under the control of DMNEs. 
Taking the above issues into account, we would contend that this third wave in 
internationalisation of innovation signifies a significant change of direction for global economic 
organisation. Neilson et al. (2014:1-2) recently argued WKDW«, ³a key feature of global economic 
organisation presented in the discussion of GVCs and GPNs is the progressive outsourcing by 
lead firms in developed countries of their peripheral, and frequently low-value, productive 
functions to low-cost countries and regions, while maintaining control of core nodes of value 
creation and retention in their home countries´7KLVYLHZLVhowever already being challenged 
by the new geography of innovation thesis (Bruche, 2009) which argues that DMNEs have also 
started to outsource some core and high-YDOXHLQQRYDWLRQIXQFWLRQVWRWKHµSHULSKHUDO¶FRXQWULHV
and regions. We contend that the third wave in international of innovation will take the 
organisation of the global economy into an even newer phase as some EMNEs start to assume a 
coordination role in some GVCs, allowing them to have a bigger say in the future scale and 
location of value creation, enhancement and retention.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have examined the rise of Chinese innovative firms and its impact on global 
economic organisation. Our analysis has indicated that their rise has featured a series of 
µVWUDWHJLFFRXSOLQJGHFRXSOLQJDQGUHFRXSOLQJ¶SURFHVVHVIn addition, associated with their rise 
is the upgrading of their positions in GVCs/GPNs which represents a significant change in global 
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economic organisation. Although our focus has been on Chinese firms, readers may find 
resonance for our findings and arguments in the case of non-Chinese EMNEs.   
Our contribution has been enabled by the use of inter-disciplinary, cognate literature from 
the international business, economic geography and development studies fields. In particular, we 
have contributed to the literature by examining the rise of Chinese innovative firms from the 
unique perspective of strategic coupling. We have also contributed WRWKHGHEDWHRQµULVLQJSRZHU 
firmV¶(Sinkovics et al., 2014; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2015) by our detailed examination of the 
potential impact of Chinese innovative firms¶ emergence on GVCs/GPNs and therefore on 
global economic organisation. Moreover, the application of the strategic coupling perspective at 
the micro-level firm-strategies supplements the extant studies in economic geography which tend 
to focus on the industry (for example, Horner, 2013) or regional level (for example, Yueng, 
2014).  
Our analysis suggests that it is perhaps naive to view Chinese firms and EMNEs in 
general as being PHUH µFRS\FDWV¶ since many of their innovations require the rethinking of 
complete production processes and business models, while also necessitating the practice of 
unique management and organisational skills (Prahalad and Mashelkar, 2010; Yin and 
Williamson, 2011). It is important for established DMNEs to recognise this as EMNEs are 
continuously disrupting global competition in their markets (Sinkovics et al., 2014). It is equally 
important for firms and regions DURXQGWKHZRUOGWRUHDOLVHWKHµUHFRXSOLQJ¶RSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWWKH
internationalisation of EMNEs may bring.   
Of course it is difficult to generalise our findings to the entire population of EMNEs or 
Chinese firms as our focus is on the leading Chinese innovative firms and we only selected two 
of them here for more detailed analysis. Nevertheless, our investigation suggests that an 
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important change is taking place in international business and global economic organisation. We 
believe that there is an urgent need to develop a stronger understanding of the implications of 
this change (Sinkovics et al., 2014; Yamin and Sinkovics, 2015). Below we outline a few lines 
for future enquiries.  
First, there is a need to study, perhaps using more quantitative approaches, the wider 
population of Chinese firms and EMNEs in general to establish more firmly the extent of the rise 
that is taking place in the accumulation of their innovation capabilities and their global business 
power. Second, we believe that future researchers could usefully examine the recoupling 
opportunities associated with internationalisation of EMNEs for firms, clusters and regions in 
both emerging and developed economies. Gereffi (2014) and Kaplinsky et al. (2011) have 
recently called for the examination of the role of emerging economies as new sources of demand 
and production competencies in the post-Washington consensus global economy. In the light of 
the emergence of the new wave in the internationalisation of innovation, we would extend their 
call to include also the examination of leading EMNEs as sources of knowledge and learning. 
Last but not the least, the rise of leading EMNEs is likely to result in a separation of the 
coordination of GVCs from the ownership of strategic innovations, resulting in the emergence of 
different power relations from the ones we observe in traditional, DMNE-dominant GVCs. It 
would be of interest to investigate the resultant impact on value creation, enhancement and 




Altenburg, T., Schmitz, H., and Stamm, A. (2008). %UHDNWKURXJK"&KLQD¶VDQG,QGLD¶V
Transition from Production to Innovation, World Development, 36 (2), 325-344. 
Awate, S., Larsen, M., Mudambi, R. (2012). EMNE catch-up strategies in the wind turbine 
industry: is there a trade-off between output and innovation capabilities? Global 
Strategy Journal, 2 (3), 205-223. 
Azmeh, S. and Nadvi, K. (2014). Asian firms and the restructuruing of global value chains. 
International Business Review, 23 (4),708-717. 
Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2004). Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, 
global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation, Progress in Human 
Geography, 28 (1), 31±56. 
Boston Consulting Group (2011). The 2011 BCG Global Challengers: Companies on the 
Move ± Rising Stars from Rapidly Developing Economies Are Reshaping Global 
Industries [online] 
Available:https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/globalization_companies
_on_the_move_2011_global_challengers. Accessed 31st July 2011. 
Bruche, G. (2009). The emergence of China and India as new competitors in MNCs' 
innovation networks, Competition and Change, 13 (3), 267-288. 
Buckley, P. J. (2009). The impact of global factory on economic development. Journal of 
World Business, 44 (2), 131-143. 
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise. London, 
UK: Macmillan. 
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. (1999). A theory of international operations. In: Buckley, P. J. 
and Ghauri, P. N. (eds.), The internationalisation of the firm. London, UK: 
International Thomson Business Press, 55-60. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A.R., Liu, X., Voss, H., and Zheng, P. (2007). The 
Determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38 (4), 499-518. 
Buckley, P. J. and Ghauri, P. N. (2004). Globalisation, economic geography and the strategy 
of multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35 (2), 81-98. 
Business Week (2005). Outsourcing Innovation, March 21, 2005. 
Cantwell, J. and Mudambi, R. (2005). MNE competence-creating subsidiary mandates, 
Strategic Management Journal, 26 (12), 1109-1128. 
Choksy, U. S. (2015). Upgrading and Power Relations in Global Value Chains: Case Study 
of an Offshoring Service Provider in the Software Industry. in The Future of Global 
Organizing, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 10, 437-465. 
Chuang, M. Y. and Johnson, W. H. A. (2011). Hop on board: the importation and future 
development of high-speed rail (HSR) in China, Journal of Technology Management 
in China, 6 (3), 232 ± 241. 
31 
Coe, N., Hess, M., Yueng, H., Dicken, P. and Henderson, J. (2004). ³*OREDOLVLQJ´UHJLRQDO
development: a global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers, 29: 468-484. 
Di Minin, A., Zhang, J. and Gammeltoft, P. (2012). Chinese foreign direct investment in 
R&D in Europe: a new module of R&D internationalisation? European Management 
Journal, 30, 189-203. 
Dunning, J. H. and Lundan, S. M. (2009). The internationalisation of corporate R&D: a 
review of the evidence and some policy implications for home countries, Review of 
Policy Research, 26 (1-2), 13-33. 
The Economist (2009). Mobile marvels. A special report on telecoms in emerging markets. 
[online] Available: http://www.economist.com/node/14483896. Accessed: 16th 
October 2010. 
The Economist (2010). The world turned upside down, Special Report-Innovation in 
Emerging Markets, [online] Available: http://www.economist.com/node/15879369. 
Accessed 31st July 2011.  
Eisenhardt, K. and Graebner, M. (2007). Theory building from cases: opportunities and 
challenges. The Academy of Management Journal, 50 (1),25-32. 
Ernst, D. (2009). A New Geography of Knowledge in the Electronics Industry? Asia's role in 
Global Innovation Networks, East-West Centre, Hawaii.  
Ernst, D. and Kim, L. (2002). Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local 
capability formation, Research Policy, 31 (8), 1417-1429. 
Fan, P. (2006) Catching up through developing innovation capability: evidence from 
&KLQD¶VWHOHFRP-equipment industry. Technovation, 26, 359-368. 
Fan, P. (2011). Innovation, globalisation, and catch-up of latecomers: cases of Chinese 
telecom firms. Environment and Planning A , 43, 830-849. 
Fu, X. and Gong, Y. (2011) Indigenous and Foreign Innovation Efforts and Drivers of 
Technological Upgrading: Evidence from China, World Development, 39 (7), 
1213-1225. 
Gereffi, G. (2014). Global value chains in a post-Washington consensus world. Review of 
International Political Economy, 21 (1), 9-37. 
Govindarajan, V and Ramamurti R (2011) Reverse innovation, emerging markets, and 
global strategy, Global Strategy Journal, 1 (3-4), 191-205. 
He, S. and Khan, Z. (2015) Subsidiary capability upgrading and parent-subsidiary 
relationship: insights from a Chinese acquisition in the UK. In: van Tulder, R., 
Verbeke, A. and Drogendijk, R. (eds.) The Future of Global Organizing. Bingley: 
Emerald. 127-141. 
Henderson, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N., and Yeung, H. (2002). Global production 
networks and the analysis of economic development, Review of International 
Political Economy, 9 (3), 436-464. 
32 
Henderson, J. and Nadvi, K. (2011). Greater China, the challenges of global production 
networks and the dynamics of transformation, Global Networks, 11 (3), 285-297. 
+RUQHU56WUDWHJLFGHFRXSOLQJUHFRXSOLQJDQGJOREDOSURGXFWLRQQHWZRUNV,QGLD¶V
pharmaceutical industry. Journal of Economic Geography, 14 (6), 1117-1140. 
Howells, J. (1990). The Internationalisation of R & D and the Development of Global 
Research Networks, Regional Studies, 24 (6), 495-512. 
Huawei (2013). 2011 Annual Report. [online] Available at 
http://www.huawei.com/ucmf/groups/public/documents/attachments/hw_126991.pdf , 
date of access: 11 October 2012. 
Huggins, R., Demirbag, M., and Ratcheva, V.I. (2007). Global Knowledge and R&D 
Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Recent Patterns in Asia Pacific, Europe, and North 
America, International Review of Applied Economics, 21 (3), 437-451.  
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (2002). How does insertion in global value chains affect 
upgrading in industrial clusters? Regional Studies, 36 (9), 1017-1027. 
IET (2007). From China with love. Communication Engineer, 5 (4), 26-31 
Immelt, J. R., Govindarajan, V., and Trimble, C. (2009) How GE Is Disrupting Itself, 
Harvard Business Review, 87 (10), 56-65.  
Kaplinsky, R., Terheggen, A., and Tijaja, J. (2011). China as a final market: the Gabon 
timer and Thai cassava value chains, World Development, 39 (7), 1177-1190. 
Khan, Z., and Nicholson, J.D. (2015). Technological catch-up by component suppliers in the 
Pakistani automotive industry: A four-dimensional analysis. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 50 (7), 40-50. 
KHL Group (2012) 2011 Global construction equipment sales grew 25% to a new record. 
[online] Available at 
http://www.forconstructionpros.com/news/10694143/2011-global-construction-equip
ment-sales-grew-25-to-a-new-record. Accessed 30 June 2012. 
Knoerich, J. (2010). Gaining from the global ambitions of emerging economy enterprises: 
An analysis of the decision to sell a German firm to a Chinese acquirer. Journal of 
International Management, 16 (2), 177-191. 
Krishna, V. V., Patra, S. K. and Bhattacharya, S. (2012). Internationalisation of R&D and 
global nature of innovation: emerging trends in India, Science Technology Society, 17 
(2), 165-199. 
Kuemmerle, W. (1999). The drivers of foreign direct investment into research and 
development: an empirical investigation, Journal of International Business Studies, 
30 (1), 1-24. 
Lema, R., Berger, A., and Schmitz, H. (2013). &KLQD¶VLPSDFWRQWKHJOREDOZLQGSRZHU
industry, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 42 (1), 37-69. 
Lew, Y. K. & Liu, Y. (2016). The contribution of inward FDI to Chinese regional 
innovation: the moderating effect of absorptive capacity on knowledge spillover, 
European Journal of International Management, 10 (3), 284-313. 
33 
Lundin, N. and Schwaag Serger, S. (2007). Globalisation of R&D and China ± Empirical 
Observations and Policy Implications. IFT Working Paper No. 710. Research 
Institute of industrial Economics: Stockholm. 
MacKinnon, D. (2012). Beyond strategic coupling: reassessing the firm-region nexus in 
global production networks. Journal of Economic Geography, 12, 227-245. 
Mathews, J. A. (2006). Dragon multinationals: new players in 21st century globalization, 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23 (1), 5±27. 
McKinsey (2015). The China Effect on Global Innovation, [online] 
http://www.mckinsey.com 
/insights/innovation/gauging_the_strength_of_chinese_innovation. Accessed on 16 
Dec. 2015 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook. Thousands Oaks: CA: Sage. 
Mudambi, R. (2008). Location, control and innovation in knowledge-intensive industries. 
Journal of Economic Geography 8 (5),699-725. 
Mudambi, R., (2015). Local enterprise, global value. Research Focus, Business and 
Management, 1,25-27. 
Narula, R. (2012). Do we need different frameworks to explain infant MNEs from 
developing countries? Global Strategy Journal 2: 188-204. 
Narula, R. and Zanfei, A. (2003). Globalisation of Innovation: The Role of Multinational 
Enterprises. DRUID Working Paper No. 03-15.  
Neilson, J., Pritchard, B., and Yeung, H.W. (2014). Global value chains and global 
production networks in the changing international political economy: an introduction, 
Review of International Political Economy, 21 (1), 1-8. 
New Financial Observer (20117KHGHFOLQHRIµ&KLQD6WDU¶-8-2011. 
OECD (2006). Science, Technology and industry Outlook, Paris. 
Pearce, R. D. (1990). The Internationalisation of Research and Development. London, UK: 
Macmillan. 
Pearce, R. D. (1999). Decentralised R&D and strategic competitiveness: globalised 
approaches to generation and use of technology in multinational enterprises, Research 
Policy, 28 (2), 157-178. 
Peerenboom, R. P. (2007). China modernizes: Threat to the west or model for the rest? 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Pietrobelli, C., Rabellotti, R. and Sanfilippo, M. (2011). Chinese FDI strategy in Italy: the 
'Marco Polo' effect, International Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and 
Development, 4 (4), 277-291. 
Prahalad, C. K. and Mashelkar, R. A. (2010). ,QQRYDWLRQ¶VKRO\JUDLOHarvard Business 
Review, 88 (7-8), 132-141. 
34 
Reddy, P. (1997). New trends in globalisation of corporate R&D and implications for 
innovation capability in host countries: a survey from India, World Development, 25 
(11), 1821-1837. 
Schmitz, H. and Strambach, S. (2009). The organisational decomposition of innovation and 
global distribution of innovative activities: insights and research agenda, International 
Journal of Technological Learning, Innovation and Development, 2 (4), 231-249. 
Science and Technology Daily (2015). CSR China: the golden brand for the 
internationalisation of high-speed railway. [Online] 
http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2015-04/07/content_299052
.htm?div=-1. Accessed on 6 June 2016. 
Shi, W. S., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B. C., and Peng, M. W. (2014). Domestic alliance network to 
attract foreign partners: Evidence from international joint ventures in China, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45 (3), 338-362. 
Sigurdson, J. (2005).Technological Superpower China, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Sinkovics, R.R., Penz, E. and Ghauri, P.N. (2008). Enhancing the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research in international business. Management International Review 48 
(6): 689-714. 
Sinkovics, R. R., Yamin, M., Nadvi, K. and Zhang, Y. Y. (2014). Rising powers from 
emerging markets ± the changing face of international business, International 
Business Review, 23 (4), 675-679. 
UNCTAD (2005a) World Investment Report 2005, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2005b) Globalisation of R&D and Developing Countries, United Nations, 
Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2014) World Investment Report 2014, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
Veldhoen, S., Mansson, A., McKern, B., Yip, G. and De Jonge, M. K. (2012). Innovation, 
&KLQD¶VQH[WDGYDQWDJH"&KLQD Innovation Survey, [online] Available at 
http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo_2012-China-Innovation-Survey.pdf, 
accessed on 9 September 2013. 
Von Zedtwitz, M. (2004). Managing foreign R&D laboratories in China, R&D 
Management, 34 (4), 439-452. 
Von Zedtwitz, M. (2005). International R&D strategies of TNCs from developing countries: 
the case of China. in UNCTAD - Globalisation of R&D and developing countries: 
UNCTAD: New York and Geneva. 
Walsh, K. A. (2007). China R&D: a high-tech field of dreams. Asia Pacific Business Review, 
13 (3), 321-335. 
Wang, C.C. and Lin, G.C.S (2010). Industrial clustering and technological innovation in 
China: new evidence from the ICT industry in Shenzhen. Environment and Planning 
A , 42,1987-2010. 
Williamson, P. J. (2015). The competitive advantages of emerging market multinationals: a 
re-assessment, Critical Perspectives on International Business, 11 (3-4), 216-235. 
35 
WIPO (2012). WIPO Statistics Data and indicators. [online] Available at 
http://www.OMPI.int/ipstats/en/statistics/, accessed on 26 March 2012. 
Xinhuanet (2011). We own the intellectual property right of the Chinese high-speed railway 
(in Chinese), [online] Available at 
http://news.XINHUANET.com/politics/2011-07/07/c_121637387.htm, date of access: 
1 October 2011. 
Yamin, M. and Sinkovics, R. R. (2015). Rising power firms - The developmental promises 
and challenges, Critical Perspectives on International Business, 11 (3-4), 210-215. 
Yeung, H.W. (2009). Regional development and the competitive dynamics of global 
production networks: an East Asian perspective. Regional Studies, 43 (3), 325-351. 
Yueng, H.W. (2014), Regional development in the global economy: a dynamic perspective of 
strategic coupling in global production networks. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 
7 (1), 1-23. 
Yin, E. and Williamson, P. J. (2011). Competitiveness of Chinese emerging multinationals 
through new approaches to innovation, paper presented at the international 
FRQIHUHQFHµ5H-DVVHVVLQJ(PHUJLQJ0DUNHW0XOWLQDWLRQDOV¶(YROYLQJ&RPSHWLWLYH
$GYDQWDJHV¶&DPEULGJH8.-27 March 2011. 
Zeng, M. and Williamson, P. J. (2007). Dragons at Your Door: How Chinese Cost 
Innovation is Disrupting Global Competition. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Zhang, L. (2009). +XDZHL¶V5	'&KLQD0DFKine Press: Beijing 
Zhu, B. (2008). ,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI&KLQHVH01(VDQG'XQQLQJ¶V(OHFWULF2/,
SDUDGLJPDFDVHVWXG\RI+XDZHL7HFKQRORJLHV&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ
















R&D 3 years 
growth 
(CAGR-3y, %) 
Banks (29 companies in the Scoreboard) 
China Merchants Bank 251 9 379.5 26.8 (one year) 2.4 
Sectoral average - - 281.6 8.4 2.0 
Construction & Materials (72 companies in the Scoreboard) 
China Railway 103 1 1011.9 59.8 1.6 
China Railway 
Construction 








242 5 401.7 29 1 
China National 
Chemical Engineering 
514 11 149.3 79.1 2.1 
Power Construction 
Corporation of China 
553 12 138.1 24.3 0.8 
Sectoral average - - 100.9 5.2 1.0 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment (242 companies in the Scoreboard) 
BYD 302 23 298.4 12.2 5.0 
Sectoral average - - 170.8 5.4 4.3 
Industrial Engineering (212 companies in the Scoreboard) 
CSR China 225 11 431 14 3.8 
China CNR 277 13 335.7 16.3 3.0 
Shanghai Electric 367 21 233.1 9.4 2.5 
Dongfang Electric 505 34 151.2 9.2 3.0 
Sany Heavy Industry 599 37 127.1 15.2 3.0 
Sectoral average - - 110.9 7.9 2.8 
Industrial Metals & Mining (41 companies in the Scoreboard) 
38 
HBIS 396 5 211.2 18.4 1.7 
Sectoral average - - 87.5 n.a 0.8 
Oil & Gas Producers (27 companies in the Scoreboard) 
PetroChina 64 1 1682.2 6.1 0.6 
China Petroleum & 
Chemicals 
151 6 752.7 7.7 0.2 
Sectoral average - - 353.7 6.0 0.3 
Technology Hardware & Equipment (334 companies in the Scoreboard) 
Huawei 26 4 3589.3 23.7 25.6 
ZTE 105 17 999.9 5.9 11.2 
Sectoral average - - 259.2 -1.8 8.0 
Travel & Leisure (24 companies in the Scoreboard) 
Ctrip 516 3 148.0 40.0 23.1 
Sectoral average - - 90.7 n.a 1.59 
Source: EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (2004-DXWKRUV¶calculation. 
Note: The sectoral average of R&D 3 year growth is proxied by that of the 633 EU companies included in 
the 2013 Scoreboard; R&D intensity is the ratio between R&D investment and net sales of a given 
company or group of companies 
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Post-war up to 1990s 
2nd wave: new geography of 
innovation 
Late 1990s up to present 
3rd wave: internationalisation 
of innovation 
From mid-2000s 
Cross-country R&D investment 
 
Between Triad countries 
(Reddy, 1997) 
Still dominated by between-Triad 
investment, but also distinctive 
investment from developed countries 
to leading developing countries 
(Bruche, 2009; UNCTAD, 2005b) 
Surging investment from leading 
developing/emerging countries to 
developed countries (Buckley et 
al., 2007; Di Minin et al., 2012) 
Nature of overseas innovation activities 
 
Initially home-base exploiting 
but later to include home-base 
augmenting (Kuemmerle, 1999; 
Pearce, 1990) 
Predominantly adaptive R&D in 
developing countries, but more 
recently also global R&D centres 
(Krishna et al., 2012; Lundin and 
Schwaag Serger, 2007; OECD, 2006) 
(01(V¶LQYHVWPHQWLQGHYHORSHG
countries featured predominantly 
with home-base augmenting 
activities (Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Mathews 2006) 
Control of GVCs 
 
DMNEs dominated DMNEs dominated, subordinate role 
for EMNEs (Yueng, 2009; Schmitz 
and Strambach, 2009) 
Distributed control: EMNEs start to 
take the coordination role, but 
DMNEs continue to control 
strategic innovation (Awate et al., 
2012; Lema et al., 2013; Altenburg 
et al., 2008) 
Strategic coupling and recoupling 
 
Between Triad countries Strategic coupling opportunities for 
firms and regions in emerging 
economies (Yueng, 2009, 2014; 
Horner, 2013) 
Recoupling opportunities created 
by EMNEs for firms and regions in 
both emerging economies and 
developed economies (He and 
Khan, 2015; Knoerich, 2010; 
Pietrobelli et al., 2011).  
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